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ECONOMIC PARTIALITY AND HORIZONTAL INEQUITY: THE 





      INTRODUCTION 
 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), enacted on December 22, 2017, 
was the most significant overhaul of the tax code in several decades. Among 
the changes was a limit on the amount of interest expense that businesses 
can deduct,1 ending the policy of full deductibility for most financing 
transactions2 that had been in place for over one hundred years.3 Businesses 
typically rely on a mixture of debt and equity to finance their productive 
assets, i.e., assets used to carry out revenue-generating business activities.4 
Businesses have no obligation to repay the amount of the equity holder’s 
investment or make regularly scheduled payments (i.e., dividends), making 
equity riskier for the investor than debt is for the creditor.5 However, the 
equity holder is compensated for the risk by having a right to profits, which 
allows them greater upside potential than debt holders who are only entitled 
to the amount of principal invested and interest payments.6 Debt and equity 
are taxed differently; interest expense paid to debt holders is tax deductible, 
while dividends or gains on capital appreciation paid to equity holders are 
 
*       J.D. Candidate (2020), Washington University in St. Louis.  
1.  26 U.S.C. § 163(j) (2018). 
2.  See infra Section II.D for an overview of the narrow exceptions to full deductibility that predated 
the TCJA. 
3.  Steven A. Bank, A Historical Perspective on the Corporate Interest Deduction, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 
29, 31 (2014). 
4.  ZANE SWANSON, BIN SRINIDHI & ANANTH SEETHARAMAN, THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PARADIGM 
2 (2003). “Debt is a contractual arrangement between the firm and the debt holders that includes the 
principal, relevant interest and maturation date. Equity defines ownership where the holder has certain 
rights to the overall direction of the firm and the disposition of residual assets at the dissolution of the 
firm.” Id. 
5.  See Will Kenton & Chris B. Murphy, Equity, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/equity.asp [https://perma.cc/L3T7-39PC]. 
6.  See SWANSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 5. 
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not.7 This discrepancy has been controversial because “[t]he lower net cost 
of corporate capital brought about by the deductibility of interest payments 
has thus been thought to bias capital structures in favor of debt, supposedly 
resulting in an inefficient unneutrality in the tax structure.”8 
The appropriateness of preferential treatment for debt financing should 
be evaluated through universally accepted tax policy objectives: taxation of 
enrichment, horizontal equity, and economic neutrality.9 The original 
Modigliani and Miller Theorem (MMT) concluded that the value of a firm 
and the cost of its capital are not affected by the choice of debt or equity in 
the absence of taxes.10 Yet, when taxes are factored in, there is a heavy 
preference for debt financing caused by the deductibility of the interest 
expense and non-deductibility of dividend payments on equity.11 This 
finding suggests that such a discrepancy in tax treatment between debt and 
equity financing violates horizontal equity and economic neutrality.12 
However, subsequent studies elaborating on the original MMT complicate 
this finding by showing that economic considerations can erode the 
attractiveness of business interest expense deductibility.13 
The context in which the interest expense deduction was enacted is also 
relevant for evaluating its consistency with horizontal equity and economic 
neutrality. The deduction was not the result of a deliberate policy decision 
enacted after a comprehensive evaluation of its impact on tax policy.14 
Instead, it resulted from a series of negotiations and compromises that were 
largely reactive to the imposition of the federal income tax after the passage 
of the Sixteenth Amendment.15 As such, the changes to the interest expense 
 
7.  BORIS I. BITTKER, BORIS S. EUSTICE, & WILLIAM P. STRENG, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 4.01[1] (2018), Westlaw. 
8.  Alvin C. Warren Jr., The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L. J. 1585, 
1606 (1974). 
9.  RICHARD K. VEDDER & LOWELL E. GALLAWAY, JOINT ECON. COMM., SOME UNDERLYING 
PRINCIPLES OF TAX POLICY 4 (1998). Essentially, taxes should be imposed only on a taxpayer’s increase 
in wealth by permitting costs of attaining such wealth to be deductible and such deductions should be 
designed so that taxpayers in the same economic position should be taxed equally and that taxpayers are 
do not choose economic decisions primarily on tax incentives. See infra Sections II.A.2 and II.A.3 for a 
more in-depth discussion of taxing enrichment, horizontal equity and economic neutrality. 
10.  See generally Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). 
11.  Id. at 294. 
12.  Warren, supra note 8. 
13.  SWANSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 8–9. 
14.  Bank, supra note 3, at 30. 
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limitation in the TCJA present a unique opportunity to conduct a policy-
based review of whether the deduction itself is appropriate—an evaluation 
that should have occurred over a century ago. 
Therefore, this Note attempts such a policy-based review of the interest 
expense deduction. Part I.A of this Note examines the history and 
application of economic neutrality and horizontal equity, i.e., the criteria 
under which the limitation on the interest-expense deduction should be 
evaluated. Part I.B of this Note explores the historical background of the 
interest expense deduction and the resulting consequences for business 
taxpayers. Part II evaluates whether the limitation on interest expense 
deduction is consistent with economic neutrality and horizontal equity. Part 
III offers two proposals based on the conclusions drawn from the analysis 
in Part II: the first is to reverse the limitation altogether and return to the 
allowance of full interest expense deductibility; however, if such a reversal 
is politically imprudent, then the second proposal is to permit full 
deductibility of disallowed deductions upon maturity of the debt. 
 
I. HISTORY 
A. Background Principles 
1. Establishment of the Federal Income Tax 
 
The history of the federal income tax began with the Sixteenth 
Amendment’s ratification into the United States Constitution in 1913. It 
allows Congress “to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source 
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without 
regard to any census or enumeration.”16 While Congress has had the power 
to impose taxes under the Constitution since the founding,17 any direct taxes 
levied must be apportioned among the states according to their 
populations.18 The Sixteenth Amendment “does not extend the taxing power 
to new or excepted subjects, but merely removes [the previously required]  
. . . apportionment among the States of taxes laid on income, whether it be 
derived from one source or another.”19 Free from the apportionment 
 
16.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
17.  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
18.  Id. § 9, cl. 4. 
19.  Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 172–173 (1918).  
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requirement, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1913, imposing a tax on 
net income of every U.S. citizen and every trade or business.20 
 
2. Taxation of Income Net of Deductions 
 
It is an established principle that the income tax must only be levied on 
the income remaining after all of a business’s expenses incurred to generate 
the gross income have been deducted.21 This is because taxing gross income 
without any deductions would be tantamount to taxing a corporation’s 
volume of transactions.22 This would contravene the fundamental premise 
that “enrichment is the best measure of the taxpayer’s ability to bear the cost 
of government. While gross income may give some indication of a 
taxpayer’s income status, it would obviously be arbitrary and in many 
instances highly unfair [for this to serve as the tax base].”23 
 
3. Policy Objectives: Horizontal Equity and Economic Neutrality 
 
Since taxes should only be levied on enrichment, Congress, with the 
help of the United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), must exercise judgment to determine which 
items are deductible so that the income remaining after such deductions best 
 
20.  Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114. 
21.  MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 117 (Robert C. 
Clark et al. eds., 14th ed. 2018). 
22.  Id.  
23.  See id. For instance, it is impossible to determine whether a small-business owner who makes one 
million dollars in revenue for a taxable year was enriched without also examining how much the owner 
incurred in expenses to generate that revenue. It could very well be the case that the owner did not net 
any positive income and therefore there was no taxable enrichment from these business transactions. Id. 
This is however, a very simplistic example to illustrate the fundamental logic of taxing enrichment; in 
practice many of the largest, most profitable companies escape corporate taxes through controversial 
use of incentives. Compare Erik Sherman, A New Report Claims Big Tech Companies Used Legal 
Loopholes to Avoid Over $100 Billion in Taxes. What Does That Mean for the Industry’s Future?, 
FORTUNE (Dec. 6, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/12/06/big-tech-taxes-google-facebook-amazon-
apple-netflix-microsoft/ [https://perma.cc/2XQH-STC7] ("Corporate taxation has been a contentious 
issue for a long time, with some profitable Fortune 500s paying no taxes in multiple years, again all on 
the legal level.”) with Stephanie Denning, Why Amazon Pays No Corporate Taxes, FORBES (Feb. 22, 
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephaniedenning/2019/02/22/why-amazon-pays-no-corporate-
taxes/#6c2f94ef54d5 [https://perma.cc/8DLP-U7GY] (“Under a scenario where Amazon had no 
corporate tax breaks, it would disincentive the company from reinvesting and thus creating greater 
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represents enrichment. Criteria must be used to assess the wisdom of such 
laws and regulations defining the scope of deductions.24 Among the various 
criteria that have been suggested for this assessment, “only three criteria are 
universally accepted by experts in public finance”: administrative 
convenience, economic neutrality, and equity.25 Equity is defined as the 
“fairness in distribution of burdens of government expenditures or of 
economic stabilization[,] . . . [which] must be an objective of any acceptable 
taxing system.”26 Horizontal equity, a subcategory of equity, is defined as 
“imposing similar burdens on people in like circumstances.”27 Economic 
neutrality refers to “avoiding or minimizing distortions of normal economic 
incentives.”28 “Virtually any tax will distort market incentives to some 
extent, but some taxes are worse than others in this respect” and should be 
avoided.29 A tax is administratively convenient if costs imposed on 
taxpayers, “such as the monies spent on tax preparation services such as H 
& R Block,” are low and evasion of taxes is difficult.30 Economic neutrality 
and horizontal equity were specifically implicated in a pair of landmark 
Supreme Court tax cases in the twentieth century, indicating their 
importance to the overall fabric of tax law.31 While administrative 
convenience is also an indispensable policy consideration, the primary 
concern for administrability is excessive complexity,32 which is not a 
 
24.  See CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 21, at 117 (explaining that to be consistent with taxing 
enrichment, business expenses should be deducted but personal expenditures should not be); VEDDER & 
GALLAWAY, supra note 9, at 7 (explaining that criteria for evaluating tax policy should also be applied 
to assessing the wisdom of deductions). 
25.  VEDDER & GALLAWAY, supra note 9, at 4. 
26.  WILLIAM D. ANDREWS & PETER J. WIEDENBECK, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 12 (Erwin 
Chemerinksy et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015). 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. 
30.  VEDDER & GALLAWAY, supra note 9, at 5. 
31.  The Supreme Court implicitly invokes horizontal equity and economic neutrality in Helvering v. 
Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940), and Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), respectively, without 
explicitly referencing these concepts. Compare Bruun, 309 U.S. at 469 (1940) (taxpayer subject to tax 
because his business transaction was complete, thereby shielding him from the risk of liability or 
possibility of profit), with Hewitt Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1935) (taxpayer 
not subject to tax because the income was dependent on future events from the ongoing business 
transaction). See Eisner, 252 U.S. at 194–195, 216, 237 (1920) (responding to the dissent’s fear that 
diverging tax treatment between stock dividend and cash dividend would allow business owners to 
escape tax, the majority held that such fears are overblown because of the dissimilar economic 
characteristics between stock dividends and cash dividends). 
32.  ANDREWS & WIEDENBECK, supra note 26, at 13. 
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significant problem in a binary issue like the deductibility of interest 
expenses.33 As such, the primary focus of this Note will be on economic 
neutrality and horizontal equity. 
In Eisner v. Macomber, the Supreme Court implicated economic 
neutrality when it decided that a corporation’s issuance of stock dividends 
to all shareholders in proportion to their ownership of stock was a non-
taxable event.34 While the term “economic neutrality” was not explicitly 
used, the Court found the issuance of stock dividends to be a non-taxable 
event by differentiating the economic qualities of stock dividends and cash 
dividends.35 In doing so, the majority essentially applied economic 
neutrality as a central principle underpinning its holding: 
It is said there is no difference in principle between a simple 
stock dividend and a case where stockholders use money 
received as cash dividends to purchase additional stock 
contemporaneously issued by the corporation. But an 
actual cash dividend, with a real option to the stockholder 
either to keep the money for his own or to reinvest it in new 
shares, would be as far removed as possible from a true 
stock dividend, such as the one we have under 
consideration, where nothing of value is taken from the 
company's assets and transferred to the individual 
ownership of the several stockholders and thereby 
subjected to their disposal.36 
The majority further elaborated that the key distinction was that 
the recipient of a stock dividend 
 
33.  Taxpayers can create complex issues by creating “unusual instruments in an effort to exploit tax 
advantages of debt without being burdened by its nontax restrictions.” BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE 
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 91.10.2 (2018), Westlaw. However, 
absent exotic financial instruments, the computation of interest expenses, particularly on conventional 
term loans, is straightforward. 
34.  Eisner, 252 U.S. at 191. 
35.  See id. at 217 (“We cannot accept [the] reasoning [that stock and cash dividends are the same, 
because doing so would be conflating] . . . a case where money is paid into the hand of the stockholder 
with an option to buy new shares with it, followed by acceptance of the option . . . with a case where the 
stockholder receives no money and has no option.”). 
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has received nothing out of the company's assets for his 
separate use and benefit; on the contrary, every dollar of his 
original investment, together with whatever accretions and 
accumulations have resulted from employment of his 
money and that of the other stockholders in the business of 
the company, still remains the property of the company, 
and subject to business risks which may result in wiping 
out the entire investment.37  
On the other hand, a cash dividend allows investors to disassociate 
themselves from the company, and by extension, the company’s business 
risk.38 The implication of the disparate economic risk borne by investors 
receiving a cash dividend and investors receiving a cash dividend is that tax 
treatment would not be the only consideration for whether shareholders vote 
for cash or stock dividends.39 Therefore, taxing cash dividends and not stock 
dividends is consistent with the principle of economic neutrality, which 
requires business “decisions [to be] made on their economic merits and not 
for tax reasons.”40 
In Helvering v. Bruun, the Supreme Court invoked horizontal equity 
when it ruled that the termination of a lease agreement was a taxable event.41 
The taxpayer in Bruun leased a plot of his land to a tenant for ninety-nine 
years.42 As part of the consideration for the lease, the tenant agreed to 
demolish the existing structure and build a new building on the taxpayer’s 
land, which significantly increased the value of the land.43 However, the 
tenant defaulted only eighteen years later, so the taxpayer terminated the 
lease and repossessed his land.44 While “horizontal equity” was not 
explicitly mentioned, in parallel with Eisner, the Supreme Court found the 
termination to be a taxable event by differentiating the economic condition 
 
37.  Id. at 211. 
38.  Cf. id. at 208–209 (“If he desires to dissociate himself from the company he can do so only by 
disposing of his stock.”) 
39.  Id. at 211 (stock dividends don’t disassociate the shareholder from the company the way cash 
dividends would, thereby continuing to expose the shareholder to ongoing business risk). 
40.  JASON FURMAN, BROOKINGS INST., THE CONCEPT OF NEUTRALITY IN TAX POLICY (2008), 
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-concept-of-neutrality-in-tax-policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/S2PE-3WQB]. 
41.  Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 467 (1940). 
42.  Id. at 464. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. 
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of a real property free and clear of a lease—which the taxpayer had 
reposessed—from one still encumbered by a lease.45 This holding implicitly 
implicated the principle of horizontal equity: By terminating the lease, the 
taxpayer in Bruun completed the transaction, thereby making the value of 
the new building on his property fully ascertainable and captured.46 The 
Court distinguished the circumstances in Bruun from those in Hewitt, where 
the value of the property was still subject to the lease and therefore exposed 
to variables due to unforeseeable future events such as the property being 
destroyed before the lessor could take back the property from the lessee.47 
“Whether there is an increase in value is a question of fact which will vary 
as the circumstances vary.”48 The taxpayer in Bruun was not in a similar 
situation as the taxpayer in Hewitt; therefore, taxing the former and not the 
latter is consistent with the principle of horizontal equity, which requires 
that “similarly situated individuals face similar tax burdens.”49 
 
4. Modigliani and Miller Theorem 
 
Given the established use of horizontal equity and economic neutrality 
in evaluating the appropriateness of tax laws, both criteria should be applied 
to tax policies involving debt and equity. This interaction between tax 
treatment and capital structure was the subject of studies conducted by 
Carnegie Mellon professors Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller 
beginning in 1958, resulting in the influential MMT.50 The first study 
showed “theoretically that the choice of a firm’s debt/equity financing mix 
has no impact on its firm value under certain assumptions.”51 The MMT 
study makes five “simplifying assumptions: (1) markets are perfect;52 (2) 
 
45.  Id. at 467, 467–69 (“The circumstances of the instant case differentiate it from the . . . Hewitt 
case[s]. . . . Here, as a result of a business transaction, the respondent received back his land with a new 
building on it, which added an ascertainable amount to its value.”). 
46.  Id. at 469 (holding that realization of gain can occur from the completion of a transaction, which 
in this case was quantified by the added value of the new building). 
47.  Hewitt Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 880, 882–883 (2d Cir. 1935). 
48.  Id. at 883. 
49.  David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 43 
(2006). 
50.  SWANSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 14. 
51.  Id.; see also Modigliani & Miller, supra note 10, at 269–271. 
52.  A perfect market is a hypothetical condition in which the following conditions are met: (1) all 
firms sell the same identical product, (2) no firm can influence the market price of this product, (3) 
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markets are complete;53 (3) firms can be categorized into equivalent risk 
classes such that the inherent business risk is the same for all firms in that 
class; (4) all investors have common beliefs about securities; and (5) all 
investors are rational.”54 The effect of taxes, growth in cash flows, and 
depreciation were not included in this 1958 study.55 As such, the 1958 study 
assumes a very simplistic, bare-bones worldview where corporations are 
faced with a binary decision of whether to finance with equity or debt 
without any other variables that might influence their decisions.56 
Modigliani and Miller found that the mix of debt compared to equity in 
a corporation’s capital structure had no effect on the corporation’s value or 
cost of capital.57 As such, a key implication of the 1958 study is that “it does 
not matter how firms finance themselves in the absence of taxes. . . . 
[Although overly simplistic, MMT] provide[s] a conceptual foundation to 
build theory.”58 In 1963, Modigliani and Miller elaborated on their first 
study by adding the effect of corporate taxes on the economic impact of 
capital structure.59 They demonstrated that, with corporate taxes, the choice 
of capital structure affects firm value because the deductibility of interest 
expenses and the non-deductibility of dividends and equity appreciation 
incentivizes the rational corporation to take on as much debt as possible.60 
The interest expense deduction results in a smaller tax expense, which 
would allow the business to retain more earnings, thereby making it more 
valuable than if it were financed only by equity.61 While incorporating the 
 
firms are perfectly mobile, and (6) firms can enter and exit the market without bearing any entry and 
exit costs. Adam Hayes, Perfect Competition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/perfectcompetition.asp [https://perma.cc/6TE7-3M79] (last 
updated June 25, 2019) 
53.  A complete market is a hypothetical condition in which a stable price, at a point where market 
supply equals market demand, for every asset in every possible state of the world. Complete Market, 
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5900 [https://perma.cc/SJ73-Q352] (last visited Jan. 1, 
2020); James Chen, Equilibrium, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/equilibrium.asp [https://perma.cc/6LXZ-NG2M] (last updated 
May 24, 2019). 
54.  SWANSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 14 (citations omitted).  
55.  Id. 
56.  See id. 
57.  Id. at 15. 
58.  Id. at 24. 
59.  Id. at 30; see also Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost 
of Capital: A Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433, 438 (1963). 
60.  SWANSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 40–41. 
61.  Id. at 40. 
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effect of income taxes into the 1963 study without more is still simplistic, it 
“provides a conceptual framework to further develop firm financing 
decision making.”62  
Other scholars have subsequently built upon this initial conceptual 
framework by incorporating the effects of other costs that could have an 
impact on the choice of capital structure in addition to taxes.63 One of these 
is the cost of bankruptcy. Studies since the 1980s have shown that there is 
a connection between a firm’s leverage and bankruptcy costs.64 Bankruptcy 
costs have been divided into three categories: (1) the direct cost of filing 
such as lawyers’ fees, accountants’ fees, trustee’s compensation and other 
administrative expenses, (2) indirect costs from lost profits like those caused 
by distracted management and supplier hesitance to provide inventory, and 
(3) lost revenues from customers concerned about potentially deteriorating 
quality and credibility of warranties and services.65 Furthermore, probability 
of default also has a greater impact on capital structure choice than do tax 
effects.66 This is because when a corporation defaults on its debt, a chain of 
events, such as the acceleration of debt payments, protracted legal 
proceedings, and the imposition of protective covenants, will cause the 
 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. at 34. 
64.  Id. at 77. Leverage is the colloquial term for the concept of borrowing in order to generate returns 
on equity in excess of what equity-only financing would generate. Adam Hayes, Leverage, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leverage.asp [https://perma.cc/BVV5-RFVZ]. 
Debt financing’s fixed repayment obligation and fixed interest payments regardless of a company’s 
profitability are what allows corporations to generate excess returns for their shareholders. Id. In a very 
simplistic example, compare two corporations, A and B. Assume both A and B have total capital of one 
hundred million dollars, and both invest in a single asset worth one hundred million dollars. Corporation 
A finances the entire one-hundred-million-dollar investment through equity, held among ten 
shareholders at ten million dollars each, while Corporation B finances using sixty million dollars of debt 
and forty million dollars of equity, held among ten shareholders at four million dollars each. Now assume 
that in five years, both A’s and B’s asset increases to $120 million in value, at which point A and B both 
sell the asset, earning proceeds of $120 million each. A’s ten shareholders receive twelve million dollars 
each, amounting to a twenty percent return on their ten-million-dollar investment. B must first use the 
sixty million dollars of proceeds to repay the sixty-million-dollar debt before it can pay out the remainder 
to its shareholders, since all debt holders have a more senior claim than equity holders. Once the debt is 
repaid, sixty million dollars of profits remain to allocate among B’s ten shareholders, who each receive 
six million dollars each. This amounts to two million dollars or a fifty percent return on each of their 
four-million-dollar investments. B was able to take advantage of the “leverage” created by the debt to 
generate higher returns for its shareholders than A despite investing in an identical asset for the exact 
same duration. 
65.  SWANSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 68. 
66.  Id. at 77. Default probability in this context means likelihood of failure to make required payments 
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stock price to drop precipitously.67 While this is not a cost in the sense of 
lost revenues or increased expenses to the corporation, it is a direct cost to 
the shareholders in the form of asset devaluation. These studies suggest that 
bankruptcy costs may act as a cap on the benefits of excessive leverage 
observed from Modigliani and Miller’s 1963 study.68 “In other words, firms 
should incrementally finance with debt up to the point that the marginal tax 
benefits equal the marginal bankruptcy costs.”69 
Another factor that exerts significant influence on a corporation’s 
choice of capital structure is its agency costs. A corporation is not a 
monolith but a nexus of contractual agreements tying together various self-
interested stakeholders who may have different and conflicting objectives.70 
An agency relationship of central relevance to the choice of capital structure 
is that between stockholders and debt holders.71 Thus,  
[c]onflicts between the stockholders and debtholders could 
arise because risky projects with high expected returns, but 
also a higher probability of very negative returns, are 
asymmetrically beneficial to stockholders and costly to 
debtholders. Debtholders do not participate in the high 
positive returns and stockholders do not participate in the 
high negative returns because of limited liability.72  
As a response, debt holders may try to extract higher returns on debt, or 
impose protective covenants, making debt overly costly, thereby shifting 
the capital structure more in favor of equity.73 Agency costs essentially 
refute the characterization of the choice of capital structure “as a strategic 
decision that is taken once after considering all the costs and benefits from 
taxes, bankruptcy and so forth.”74 Instead, “capital structure decisions are 
 
67.  Id. Protective covenants are terms written into a loan agreement between the borrower and lender 
that impose restrictions on the activities of the borrower in the event of default, such as freezing all 
dividend payments until the corporation has enough cash to satisfy the debt payment obligations. Adam 
Hayes, Covenant, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/covenant.asp 
[https://perma.cc/8U4K-DJLX]. 
68.  SWANSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 81. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. at 94. 
71.  Id. at 95. 
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. at 95–96. 
74.  Id. at 107 (emphasis added). 
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dynamic and continuously changing and need to be integrated with the 
overall management of the firm and its various market environments.”75 
 
B. Early History of the Interest Expense Deduction 
 
Horizontal equity, economic neutrality, the MMT, and the taxation of 
enrichment are key conceptual foundations against which the propriety of a 
limit on interest expense deductions should be weighed. However, the 
beginnings of the deduction were founded on much more pragmatic bases, 
some of which the Sixteenth Amendment and subsequent case law made 
obsolete.76 “[A]lthough there may be appropriate arguments in favor of 
maintaining a full corporate interest deduction, the historical premise for the 
origins of the corporate income tax system is not one of them. . . . The 
corporate interest deduction emerged because of expedience, not tax policy 
per se.”77 
 
1. Pre-Sixteenth Amendment Debates and Interest-Deduction  
Limitation of 1990 
 
The corporate interest deduction spurred significant debate when it was 
first proposed in 1894.78 One concern voiced by those opposed to the 
interest expense deduction was that 
in the absence of an individual income tax as a backstop to 
the corporation tax, an interest deduction meant that “the 
‘bloated bondholder’ . . . escapes altogether . . . . 
Multimillionaires like Mr. Carnegie, whose wealth is 
mostly in bonded investments, go free, while the owner of 
no more than one share of stock in any paying corporation 
is taxed.”79 
A corollary complaint was that “heavily bonded concerns doing 
business in competition with those with little or no funded debt would 
 
75.  Id. 
76.  Bank, supra note 3, at 31. 
77.  Id. at 30. 
78.  Id. at 31–34. 
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practically escape taxation, an obviously inequitable advantage.”80 “The 
concern was that because of the different treatment of debt and equity, 
corporations and investors would take advantage of the relative fungibility 
of the different instruments and evade the tax by substituting bonds for 
stocks.”81 
On the other hand, “[r]equiring corporations to pay interest with post-
tax money, however, was also controversial.”82 Republican Senator Elkins’s 
objection to non-deductibility of the interest expense was that disallowing 
an interest-expense deduction essentially fails to “distinguish between 
[total] capital and capital stock [i.e. equity], as some corporations raised all 
their capital by bond issues and had very little stock.”83 This objection is 
still relevant: it comments on the fundamental distinction between the 
characteristics of debt and of equity. Other complaints against non-
deductibility were related to constitutional issues that became irrelevant 
after the federal government was permitted to levy non-apportioned taxes 
on income.84  
As a compromise, Congress permitted “corporations to deduct interest, 
but [required them] to cap the amount of the deduction to an amount of 
bonds equal to the par value of the corporation’s capital stock [i.e. 
equity].”85 Theoretically, “the cap would generally limit bonded 
indebtedness from growing beyond its existing one-to-one status with 
capital stock[,] . . . [which] also reflected Congress’ concern about the 
practice of over-leveraging.”86 The intention was for the cap to “serve as a 
 
80.  Id. at 35. 
81.  Id. at 38. 
82.  Id. at 36. 
83.  Id. 
84.  One criticism resulted from tax-free covenants that lenders imposed on borrowers. Id. at 37. These 
covenants required borrowers to reimburse lenders for any tax that the lenders had to pay. Id. If 
borrowers were not permitted to deduct the interest expenses, then they would effectively be double 
taxed, which can be construed as “unconstitutionally impairing a contract.” Id. However, this problem 
became irrelevant after the Supreme Court held in Old Colony Trust v. Commissioner that the amount 
of any tax reimbursement is taxable as in-kind income. 279 U.S. 716, 731 (1929). In a post-Old Colony 
Trust landscape, a payment by the borrower for reimbursing the lender’s tax obligation would itself be 
taxable as income to the lender. Id. The Old Colony Trust decision essentially set the precedent for the 
very expansive scope of income codified in 26 U.S.C. § 61(a). ANDREWS & WIEDENBECK, supra note 
26, at 42. 
85.  Bank, supra note 3, at 39. 
86.  Id. at 39–40. 
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dividing line between legitimate and what might have been considered 
excessive business debt.”87 
 
2. Post-Sixteenth Amendment Climate 
 
After the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment and enactment of federal 
income tax legislation, a concern arose about the use of a deferral shield88 
to allow shareholders to dodge, at least temporarily, the income tax.89 The 
concern could have been an opportunity to explore “means of reconciling 
the differential tax treatment of debt and equity.”90 Nevertheless, the 
deductibility cap remained, but there were further attempts to convince 
Congress to remove it. Some argued against setting the cap according to a 
debt-to-equity ratio because they believed that doing so violated horizontal 
equity by disadvantaging real-estate corporations.91 Real-estate 
corporations typically borrow mortgages constituting up to two-thirds of the 
value of their underlying assets, while corporations in other industries 
typically have smaller proportions of debt than equity in their capital 
structures.92 “[L]arge corporations with millions of bonds outstanding are 
permitted to deduct all of the interest which they pay on their bonds, while 
. . . the small corporation that owns the buildings leased by the large 
corporations is penalized by being unable to deduct from the rents paid by 
the large corporations the full amount of the interest which it has been 
obliged to pay to its mortgagee.”93 On the other side of the debate, bond-
issuer wealth “was still prominent in policy discussions.”94 “[C]orporation 
bonds were an important part of corporate financing at this time, with the 
 
87.  Id. at 40. 
88.  A tax deferral shield is “a reduction in taxable income for an individual or corporation achieved 
through claiming allowable deductions. . . [thereby allowing a taxpayer to] defer income taxes into future 
years. Julia Kagan, Tax Shield Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/taxshield.asp [https://perma.cc/XR9F-AE9M]. 
89.  Bank, supra note 3, at 41. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. at 41–42 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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gross amount of corporate bonds outstanding equaling $17.4 billion in 
1913.”95 
In the years following 1913, businesses and politicians began to turn 
against the interest deduction cap in favor of allowing unlimited 
deductions.96 The cap was seen as a relic of policy concerns that were 
anachronistic in a post-Sixteenth Amendment world.97 According to 
railroad lawyer Alfred Thom, “[t]he present [interest expense cap] provision 
has apparently been taken over from the old corporation excise law without 
consideration of the effect of the establishment of a net income tax on 
individuals.”98 Representative Sherley, a Democrat from Kentucky, stated 
that “when you do not tax individuals but only tax corporations, you should 
have a particular provision touching interest payments. But now you are 
taxing both the corporation and the individual.”99 
Congress resisted the pressure to remove the cap but offered a 
concession in 1916 by permitting entities to “deduct the interest on an 
amount of debt equal to the paid-up capital stock and one-half the 
outstanding indebtedness.”100 However, when the United States entered 
World War I, it levied a tax on “excess profits” and “war profits” based on 
a definition of “invested capital” that only included equity and not debt.101 
Since debt holders were not permitted to include debt among their capital 
base, they would have significantly greater taxable “excess profits” than 
equity holders earning the same profits.102 This resulted in further criticism 
that it “was inequitable since ‘all funds used in business . . . are capital in 
the economic sense.’”103 The House Ways and Means Committee reasoned 
that “[s]ince borrowed money is not allowed to be included in computing 
invested capital for the purpose of the war profits and excess profits tax, it 
seems only fair to allow as a deduction in computing net income the whole 
 
95.  Id. at 42–43. This is roughly equivalent to $456 billion in 2019 dollars. See CPI Inflation 
Calculator, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=17.40&year1=191301&year2=201911 [https://perma.cc/Z35H-L56N]. 
96.  Bank, supra note 3, at 43–44. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. at 44. 
99.  Id. at 43–44. 
100.  Id. at 45–46. 
101.  Id. at 46. 
102.  See id. 
103.  Id.  
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amount of the interest paid during the year.”104 This logic convinced 
Congress to pass the Revenue Act of 1918, which allowed “interest on 
corporate debt [to become] fully deductible for the first time.”105 
The corporate interest deduction was not the result of a single, 
comprehensive design that broadly considered tax policies.106 Instead, it was 
“a pragmatic compromise between those concerned that corporations would 
become over-leveraged to avoid the entity-level tax and those concerned 
that not permitting an interest deduction would unfairly disadvantage 
corporations that needed such leverage.”107 The cap “was only removed 
when the larger issue of taxing wartime profits made the tax treatment of 
heavily leveraged companies more problematic.”108 While the principles of 
taxing enrichment, horizontal equity, and economic neutrality were evoked 
to justify one position or the other, the continuously changing tax laws 
resulted in myopic, reactive applications of these principles. Changes such 
as the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment and the wartime taxes distracted 
policymakers from conducting a more comprehensive assessment of the 
interest-expense deduction’s merits.  
The continuing relevance to the current TCJA is evident: 
This historical context also provides perspective for 
modern advocates of a cap on the corporate interest 
deduction. For instance, Senator Wyden justifies the 
proposal contained in his bill with Republican Senator Dan 
Coats on similar grounds of over-leverage and the ease of 
shifting between equity and debt. According to the 
information statement on the bill, the cap is justified as 
necessary to “create[] a more even playing field between 
corporate debt and equity by cutting the value of inflation 
from a corporation’s interest deduction on debt.” The 
statement continues to note that “[c]utting the value of this 
tax deduction will reduce a company’s financial incentive 
to take on debt.”109 
 
 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. at 47. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. 








2020]                 Economic Partiality and Horizontal Inequity                265 
 
 
C. Consequences of the Deductibility of Interest 
 
The deductibility of business interest expenses remained unchanged for 
over one hundred years. It survived the major tax reforms of the twentieth 
century, including rigorous debates during the 1960s and 1970s over 
whether the tax base should remain enrichment-focused or be changed to a 
consumption focus. The IRS has the power to recharacterize an instrument 
as either debt or equity because of a landmark Supreme Court decision 
holding that transactions are taxed according to their substance rather than 
their form.110 If a taxpayer’s instrument is recharacterized from debt to 
equity, each interest payment is not deductible and the lender becomes an 
equity owner in the borrower.111 This could create punitive consequences 
for existing shareholders.112 Since the tax benefits of deducting interest 
expenses are so significant, “[t]axpayers sometimes experiment with 
unusual instruments in an effort to exploit tax advantages of debt without 
being burdened by its nontax restrictions.”113 However, the IRS “may be 
unwilling to accept the taxpayer’s label [of an instrument as debt] as 
controlling. . . . [And] tax consequences of a recharacterization can be 
extremely unpleasant.”114  
As such, “[m]ost litigated cases on the debt vs. equity issue are 
concerned with obligations having all the conventional earmarks of debt, 
including a fixed maturity date, fixed interest payments, no voting rights, 
and no subordination to general creditors.”115 In Estate of Mixon v. United 
States, a landmark case, the Fifth Circuit provided the following factors to 
determine whether an instrument is debt or equity:  
 
110.  See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469–70 (1935). 
111.  STEPHEN SCHWARZ & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 122 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 9th ed. 2016). 
112.  For example, under 26 U.S.C. § 351, a shareholder can contribute property to its corporation 
without recognizing any gain on the property if, among other requirements, the shareholder has eighty 
percent of the corporation’s shares and eighty percent of the voting power in the corporation (known as 
a “351 Transaction”). 26 U.S.C. §§ 351, 368(c) (2012). A lender that becomes an unexpected equity 
owner could inadvertently turn what otherwise would be a valid 351 Transaction into a taxable sale of 
property by the shareholder to the corporation if the lender caused the shareholder’s ownership and 
voting power to fall below eighty percent. 
113.  BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 33, at 2. 
114.  SCHWARZ & LATHROPE, supra note 111. 
115.  BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 33, at 2. 
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(1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the 
indebtedness; (2) The presence or absence of a fixed 
maturity date; (3) The source of payments; (4) The right to 
enforce payment of principal and interest; (5) participation 
in management flowing as a result; (6) the status of the 
contribution in relation to regular corporate creditors; (7) 
the intent of the parties; (8) “thin” or adequate 
capitalization; (9) identity of interest between creditor and 
stockholder; (10) source of interest payments; (11) the 
ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside 
lending institutions; (12) the extent to which the advance 
was used to acquire capital assets; and (13) the failure of 
the debtor to repay on the due date or to seek a 
postponement.116 
Congress attempted but failed to provide specific guidance because of 
the uncertainties in common law arising from issues around debt or equity 
characterization.117 As such, “Congress delegated the chore to the executive 
branch by enacting Section 385, which authorizes the Treasury to 
promulgate such regulations ‘as may be necessary or appropriate’ to 
determine for all tax purposes whether an interest in a corporation is to be 
treated as stock or debt.”118 In October 2016, the U.S. Treasury enacted 26 
C.F.R. § 1.385 (385 Regulations), but these regulations only provide 
requirements for avoiding per se recharacterization into equity and do not 
provide insight into what factors are sufficient for debt characterization.119 
Failing the documentation requirements would automatically recharacterize 
an instrument into equity,120 but meeting the requirements would not 
guarantee debt characterization.121 
 
116.  Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972). 
117.  SCHWARZ & LATHROPE, supra note 114, at 141. 
118.  Id. 
119.  26 C.F.R. §§ 1.385-1 to -4T (2016) (providing annual documentation requirements to avoid 
automatic recharacterization of related-party debt to equity, and providing a list of forbidden 
transactions, such as leveraged distributions, which result in automatic recharacterization if a distribution 
is made within three years of a related-party debt issuance). 
120.  Id. § 1.385-2(b)(1) (2016) (“If the documentation and information . . . are not prepared and 
maintained . . . [the debt instrument] is treated as stock for all federal tax purposes.”). 
121.  Id. § 1.385-2(a)(2) (2016) (“Compliance with this section does not establish that an interest is 
indebtedness; it serves only to satisfy the minimum documentation for the determination to be made 
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D. Changes to the Interest Expense Deduction in the TCJA 
 
Limitations on the amount of deductible interest existed prior to the 
TCJA, but generally applied to related-party debt.122 The purpose of such 
pre-TCJA restrictions in 26 U.S.C. § 163(j) was to bar “certain corporations 
from taking a deduction for ‘disqualified interest.’”123 Determination of 
“whether interest should be treated as ‘disqualified interest,’ primarily 
focused on transactions resulting in the tax-free removal of value from the 
U.S. tax system.”124 However, post-TCJA “the allowable deduction for 
business interest is capped at the sum of the business interest income of the 
taxpayer for the taxable year, plus 30% of the adjusted taxable income of 
the taxpayer for the taxable year, plus the floor-plan financing interest of 
the taxpayer for the taxable year.”125 Furthermore, § 163(j) now applies to 
commercial third-party debt, which was not the case prior to the TCJA.126 
“For the taxable years beginning before January 1, 2022, adjusted taxable 
income is computed without regard to deductions allowable for 
depreciation, amortization, or depletion.”127 After December 31, 2021, 
“these items will be included in adjusted taxable income, which will reduce 




A. Business Risk of Debt and Equity Financing 
 
Under the tax policy objective of taxation of enrichment, Congress, 
along with Treasury and the IRS, must pass laws and regulations defining 
 
treated for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code as stock or indebtedness . . . is determined based on 
common law”). 
122.  Robert E. Holo, Jasmine N. Hay & William J. Smolinski, Not So Fast: 163(j), 245A, and Leverage 
in the Post-TCJA World, 128 YALE L.J.F. 383, 384 (2018). 
123.  Id. at 385. 
124.  Id. at 385–86. 
125.  Id. at 387 (footnote omitted). “Floor plan financing interest is indebtedness relating to the 
acquisition of motor vehicles held for sale or lease and secured by such vehicles. 26 U.S.C. § 
163(j)(9)(A) (2018). It thus is not relevant to the majority of the majority of multinationals evaluating 
these new rules.” Id. at 387 n.24. 
126.  Id. at 388. 
127.  Id. at 391. 
128.  Id. 
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the scope of income and deductions so that the net taxable income best 
represents enrichment.129 Horizontal equity and economic neutrality are two 
of the three universally accepted criteria for evaluating the wisdom of such 
laws and regulations.130 MMT can be cited for justification for why the pre-
TCJA preferential treatment of debt financing violates both horizontal 
equity and economic neutrality. However, the original MMT examines only 
the value of the firm and the cost of capital, both of which are opaque 
numbers that do not shed any insight into whether the interest expense 
deduction is consistent with horizontal equity or economic neutrality. The 
Supreme Court, in Eisner and Bruun, provides an insightful way to evaluate 
the interest expense deduction’s adherence to horizontal equity and 
economic neutrality.131 In Eisner, the majority held that “the essential and 
controlling fact is that every dollar of [the stockholder’s] original 
investment, together with whatever accretions and accumulations have 
resulted from employment of his money . . . still remains the property of the 
company, and subject to business risks which may result in wiping out the 
entire investment.”132 Therefore, the majority reasoned, “an actual cash 
dividend, with a real option to the stockholder either to keep the money for 
his own or to reinvest it in new shares, would be as far removed as possible 
from a true stock dividend.”133 This critically undermines Justice Brandeis’s 
assertion that dividends distributed as cash or stock “are recognized . . . to 
be equivalents; and that the financial results to the corporation and to the 
stockholders of the two methods [of distribution] are substantially the 
same—unless a difference results from the application of the federal Income 
Tax Law,”134 because the business risk that a shareholder faces from a cash 
dividend is, in the majority’s words, “as far removed as possible” from a 
stock dividend. As such, it is not appropriate to assert that “the owners of 
the most successful businesses in America will, as the facts in this case 
 
129.  While taxation of enrichment is itself a policy objective, it is not particularly helpful as a criteria 
for determining the appropriateness of tax laws and regulations because it is overly broad and easy to 
meet, as even a grossly economically non-neutral tax on net income will be a tax on enrichment. See 
supra Sections I.A.2 and I.A.3. 
130.  The third policy is administrative convenience, which although universally accepted, functions 
more as a backstop justification in overriding equity and neutrality concerns. VEDDER & GALLAWAY, 
supra note 9. 
131.  See supra text accompanying notes 34–49. 
132.  See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 211 (1920). 
133.  Id. at 215. 
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illustrate, be able to escape taxation on a large part of what is actually their 
income,”135 because they have business risk in addition to tax advantages to 
take into consideration when deciding whether to issue stock or cash 
dividends. Therefore, it would be reasonable to infer that the majority 
believes the key element preserving economic neutrality between cash and 
stock dividends to be business risk. 
In Bruun, the taxpayer terminated a lease after his lessee defaulted 
eighteen years into their ninety-nine-year contract, enabling him to recover 
his land—along with the building that his lessee built—eighty-one years 
early. The Supreme Court held that the lease termination was a taxable event 
because “the respondent received back his land with a new building on it, 
which added an ascertainable amount to its value.”136 The Court 
distinguished the taxpayer in Bruun from the taxpayer in Hewitt Realty 
because in Hewitt, the taxpayer’s lease remained in effect, thereby 
subjecting him to uncertainty as to the value of his property by the time he 
would eventually repossess it free from the lease.137 The Court recognized 
in Bruun that when the taxpayer’s transaction was terminated, he was 
thereby allowed to recover his property without exposing himself to 
potential future risks, risks articulated in Hewitt, such as the destruction of 
his building.138 Therefore, while not explicitly stated, it is reasonable to infer 
that the Supreme Court is again finding future risk to be the dispositive 
element in permitting disparate tax treatment between the taxpayer in Bruun 
and the taxpayer in Hewitt. 
Since the Supreme Court relies on business risk as a dispositive factor 
in these tax cases, business risk would also be appropriate to evaluate 
whether the business interest expense deduction is consistent with 
horizontal equity and economic neutrality. Debt-financing transactions are 
riskier for the issuer but safer for the investor, while equity-financing 
transactions are safer for the issuer and riskier for the investor.139 Debt 
transactions carry a similar level of risk to lease transactions because they 
both have comparable characteristics: neither furnishes any ownership 
 
135.  Id. at 237. 
136.  See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940). 
137.  Cf. id. at 467 (“Circumstances of the instant case differentiate it from the . . . Hewitt case.”); supra 
text accompanying notes 45–48. 
138.  See Brunn, 309 U.S. at 469; Hewitt, 76 F.2d at 883. 
139.  Karen Berman & Joe Knight, When is Debt Good?, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 15, 2009), 
https://hbr.org/2009/07/when-is-debt-good [https://perma.cc/QR2H-BST9]. 
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interest in the borrower/lessee; they both generally involve predictable, 
regular payments; and default occurs if the corporation fails to meet any one 
of its payments.140 On the other hand, debt financing is riskier for an issuer 
because the regular obligation to make interest payments to lenders could 
be overly burdensome if the issuer is unable to generate enough cash.141 
 
B. Horizontal Equity 
 
The interest deduction limitation will likely exacerbate horizontal 
inequity rather than alleviate it the way Senators Wyden and Coats believed. 
Since a corporation financing itself through debt and another financing itself 
through leases have comparable levels of risk, tax treatment of their cost of 
compensating their debtors or lessors should be identical. Limiting the 
amount of interest expense that corporations can deduct while allowing the 
entire lease expense or cost of goods sold to be deducted would be 
inconsistent with the principle of horizontal equity. On the other hand, the 
risk facing a corporation financed with debt is higher than that of a 
corporation financed with equity, so it is entirely acceptable for the tax 
treatment of interest expense and dividends to be different. 
 
C. Economic Neutrality 
 
The interest expense limit also violates economic neutrality because of 
the difference in risk profile between debt and financing transactions. 
Allowing more favorable tax treatment for corporations that rely primarily 
on leases compared to those that rely primarily on debt despite facing the 
same economic risk profile would incentivize corporations to choose the 
former for a non-business tax-related purpose. For example, if a corporation 
needs to acquire a capital asset such as equipment, it should be indifferent 
 
140.  James Chen, Default, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/default2.asp 
[https://perma.cc/L5HU-F538]; James Chen, Lease, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lease.asp [https://perma.cc/ZQF9-X8HF]; Christina Majaski, 
Debt Financing vs. Equity Financing: What's the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/05/debtcheaperthanequity.asp [https://perma.cc/RV3K-
NGPQ]; What Happens if I Default on a Commercial Lease?, TELLUS REAL ESTATE, 
https://tellusre.com/landlording/what-happens-if-i-default-on-a-commercial-lease/ 
[https://perma.cc/6XE5-RP4S]. 
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between borrowing a term loan to purchase the equipment or leasing it, 
because both options have similar economic risks. However, if leasing 
provides favorable tax treatment because the entire lease expense is 
deductible while the interest expense on debt is subject to a deductibility 
limitation, corporations would rationally choose to lease instead of purchase 
with borrowed funds, despite there being limited substantive economic 
difference between the two options for the corporation. Economic neutrality 
requires that tax laws refrain from creating distortions that motivate 
taxpayers to make business decisions based on tax treatment rather than 
economic considerations.142  
On the other hand, equivalent tax treatment between corporations that 
finance through debt and those that finance through equity is not necessary 
for economic neutrality. As subsequent studies elaborating upon the MMT 
have shown, bankruptcy costs and agency costs, i.e., economic factors 
relating to debt and equity financing, are significant enough to dissuade 
companies from gravitating towards one or the other on the basis of tax 
treatment.143 Furthermore, risk of default prevents corporations from 
financing entirely through debt despite favorable tax treatment under the 
full interest expense deductibility regime because debt places significantly 
more pressure on corporations to generate cash flow in order to service 
interest payments, while equity allows them to pursue longer-term 
investment horizons.144 For instance, many startup companies—particularly 
those in the high technology and pharmaceutical industries that require 
significant amounts of front-end research and development expenditure but 
do not become profitable for many years—would choose to finance through 





The best remedy is to remove the interest deduction limitation 
entirely so that horizontal equity and economic neutrality are restored 
 
142.  ANDREWS & WIEDENBECK, supra note 26, at 12–13. 
143.  See generally SWANSON ET AL., supra note 4 (finding that other considerations such as bankruptcy 
concerns and agency costs dampen the benefits of deductibility of interest found from the original MMT 
study). 
144.  Id. at 68–69. 
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between debt and leases. There are no major policy drawbacks to 
implementing this proposal, but doing so could be politically inexpedient 
given that Congress would be repealing the changes to § 163(j) soon after 
they were passed. 
A potential compromise would allow for meaningful deferral and not 
effective disallowance by including a disallowed interest deduction 
recapture provision. A problem with the current mechanics of the limitation 
is that while § 163(j) permits disallowed deductions to be carried forward, 
many corporations never operate without any debt, so any disallowed 
interest deduction amounts carried forward would compete with the interest 
expenses generated in the future taxable year for allowable deduction room. 
To take advantage of the deferral, the corporation must repay its existing 
debt with either cash on hand or equity offerings to avoid generating 
additional interest expenses that would consume the amount of adjusted 
taxable income allowed for deductibility. As such, this deduction deferral 
provision in substance can often function like a permanent disallowance. 
An amendment to § 163(j) that provides for the accumulated interest 
disallowed under § 163(j)(1) to be deducted in full upon maturity of the loan 
would be the ideal solution. 
For example, assume Corporation C has an adjusted taxable income of 
ten million dollars in Year 1 and has a five-year term loan of one hundred 
million dollars at a five-percent interest rate, resulting in five million dollars 
of annual interest expense. According to the new § 163(j) limitation, C 
would only be allowed to deduct three million dollars, i.e., thirty percent of 
ten million dollars. As such, the remaining two million dollars of interest 
expense must be carried forward. Therefore, C would not be able to deduct 
these two million dollars for at least five years because it would incur the 
same five million dollars of interest expense until the term loan matures. 
Unless its adjusted taxable income increases to above $16.67 million (thirty 
percent of which is five million dollars) without incurring additional debt, 
it will never have enough adjusted taxable income to absorb the non-
deductible interest. In fact, when the term loan matures in five years, C will 
have accumulated ten million dollars of non-deductible interest if its 
adjusted taxable income remains constant.145 The only way C can deduct 
 
145.  While it is unlikely to assume that taxable income for a business would remain constant over five 
years, it is reasonable to assume that capital intensity would remain relatively constant over the growth 
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this amount is to become entirely equity-funded, which may not be 
practicable because of its business model or shareholder demands, thereby 
making interest on this loan effectively non-deductible in perpetuity.146 The 
proposed amendment would allow C to deduct the entire ten million dollars 
when its term loan matures. 
There are drawbacks to this interest-recapture proposal. The first is that 
it does not restore the economic neutrality and horizontal equity discrepancy 
with leases because those remain deductible as accrued. Nevertheless, it 
somewhat bridges the gap in treatment because deferral is preferable to 
effective disallowance. Another drawback is that it may encourage 
companies to borrow at shorter maturities so that they can claim their 
backlogged deductions more frequently. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that the market would correct for this apparent drawback; 
economically rational lenders offer lower interest rates for short-term debt 
than for long-term debt.147 A rational third-party lender would likely notice 
if a borrower continues to repeatedly refinance short-term debt. Such a 
lender would start charging higher rates that are commensurate with those 
of longer maturities to compensate itself for the risk and capital lock-in of 
longer-term financing. Lenders often request access to a firm’s financial 
statements during the underwriting stage and can easily detect a borrower 
that is employing short-term debt to finance long-term assets.148 Since the 
aggressive use of short-term debt to finance assets was a significant 
aggravator of damage in the 2008 financial crisis, banks would be much 
more alert about taking on this type of risk.149 
Furthermore, the IRS can look through the form of the transaction to the 
substance.150 If a borrower continues to refinance and claim full deductions 
 
more interest expense for the company, thereby consuming more of the adjusted taxable income allowed 
for deductibility. 
146.  See text accompanying supra note 61 (arguing that leverage results in higher rates of return for 
shareholders).  
147.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, DAILY TREASURY YIELD CURVE RATES (Aug. 2, 2019), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-
rates/pages/textview.aspx?data=yield [https://perma.cc/G2KR-CNGV]. 
148.  Mary Ellen Biery, Looking to Borrow? You May Need an Audit, Review or Compilation, FORBES 
(Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sageworks/2016/11/26/looking-to-borrow-you-may-
need-an-audit-review-or-compilation/#1e29d10946cd [https://perma.cc/3TH4-MUPC]. 
149.  Philip E. Strahan, Liquidity Risk and Credit in the Financial Crisis, 2012–15 FED. RES. BANK S.F. 
ECON. LETTER (2012) https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-
letter/2012/may/liquidity-risk-credit-financial-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/H5QN-UQ3Z]. 
150.  See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 467–71 (1935). 
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while paying interest rates consistent with longer-term debt, the IRS should 
be able to recharacterize the debt as long-term debt and disallow the excess 
deductions. It can also observe patterns in which taxpayers are repeatedly 
refinancing short-term liabilities to fund long-term assets and disallow full 
deductions on maturity when it identifies abusive practices. The advantage 
of disallowing recapture deductions over recharacterizing debt as equity is 
that it avoids some of the grislier effects of debt recharacterization. The 
lender does not suddenly acquire an ownership interest in the borrower, so 
other provisions of tax code that has ownership percentage requirements 




The TCJA’s modifications to interest-expense deductibility was likely 
motivated in part by the mistaken belief that tax treatment of debt and equity 
financing should be identical under the principles of economic neutrality 
and horizontal equity. Such a belief was likely supplied by MMT’s 
conclusion that a firm’s value is identical regardless of whether it finances 
through debt or equity without the effect of taxes.151 What proponents of the 
interest-expense limitation overlooked was that the economic risk profile of 
debt-financing transactions is very similar to that of leases. On the other 
hand, debt has a very different risk profile for the issuer than that of equity 
financing. 
Congress attempted to bridge the tax-treatment gap between debt and 
equity, but it did not need to be bridged. Instead, Congress created an 
inconsistency in tax treatment between debt and leases. Such an 
inconsistency creates incentives for companies to choose leases over debt 
independent of business reasons. This is incompatible with the established 
tax policy objectives of economic neutrality and horizontal equity. The ideal 
correction is to restore the full deductibility of the interest expense. But 
Congress should at least allow for a disallowed-interest recapture provision 





151.  Modigliani & Miller, supra note 10, at 295–96. 
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